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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

THE ARGUMENT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL
ABDUCTION OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS
AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Joel R. Paul*
On April 2, 1990, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican gynecologist, was abducted by a group of armed men from his office in Guadalajara, Mexico. He was threatened with a gun, taken to a hideout
and later flown by plane against his will to El Paso, Texas, where he
was met by agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
("DEA") who arrested him. He was later arraigned on charges related
to the abduction, torture and murder in Mexico of a United States
DEA agent, Enrique Camarena. The men responsible for the abduction
of Dr. Alvarez-Machain have been indicted in Mexico for his abduction. At least seven of these men and their families have been given
sanctuary in the United States, and the DEA has paid the abductors
for turning Alvarez-Machain over to the DEA. The abductors continued to receive a total weekly stipend paid by the United States
Government.
In response the Mexican Government has filed several written protests to the United States Department of State arguing that the abduction and arrest of Alvarez-Machain violated the United States - Mexico Extradition Treaty of 1980 and seeking the extradition of the
kidnappers. The United States Government apparently has denied
extradition.
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Although the United States Government initially denied any involvement in the abduction, the DEA agent responsible for the operation has
testified that the DEA met with an informant who arranged the abduction in exchange for a promise that the DEA would pay a $50,000
reward plus expenses for delivering Alvarez-Machain to the United
States authorities.
United States Federal District Judge Edward Rafeedie issued an
opinion on August 10, 1990, declining jurisdiction over AlvarezMachain, based on the violation of the Extradition Treaty by the
United States, and ordering the United States to repatriate him.1 Judge
Rafeedie's order has been stayed by the Ninth Circuit pending an appeal brought by the United States to reverse the order.
The United States argues that the long-standing precedent of Ker v.
Illinois,2 should defeat Alvarez-Machain's defense that he was improperly brought into court by the Government's illegal action. The first
important issue is whether Ker is controlling under the circumstances
in this case. The second, if Ker does not bar the defense, involves the
question whether the Court lacks jurisdiction of Alvarez-Machain because the United States allegedly denied him due process and violated
both the Extradition Treaty and customary international law in orchestrating an abduction in the territory of another friendly state. I will
discuss briefly the applicability of the Ker rule and the due process
argument. I will not discuss the question of whether the abduction violated international law. That issue is addressed in brief by Professor
Ruth Wedgwood of Yale Law School, filed in the Ninth Circuit on
behalf of the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights.
First, at a superficial glance, the facts in Ker seem sufficiently analogous for the case to be controlling. Ker was convicted in Illinois of
larceny and embezzlement. The bank sent a Pinkerton agent to Peru
with a request for extradition signed by the President. The Pinkerton
agent did not bother to present the request for extradition, however.
Instead, he forcibly seized Ker and brought him back to the United
States to stand trial. After his conviction, Ker appealed to the Supreme
Court arguing that he had been denied due process and that his seizure
violated an extradition treaty with Peru. The Supreme Court dismissed
both arguments. The Court held that "we do not think he is entitled to
say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is
1. United States v. Caro-Quintero, et. al, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
2. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886). See generally, RESTATEMENT ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW (Third) § 433 Corn. b., RN 3.
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charged in a regular indictment." 3 Moreover, the Court found that the
treaty did not entitle him to a right to asylum in Peru.
On closer examination, however, there are key facts which distinguish Ker from Alvarez-Machain. Unlike Ker, who was a United
States citizen, Alvarez-Machain was seized from his country of citizenship. More importantly, the Government of Mexico has objected
through diplomatic notes on an official level that the abduction violated
Mexico's rights under the Extradition Treaty. By contrast, Peru, which
was occupied at the time by Chilean troops, never objected to Ker's
seizure. Indeed, the very notion of Peruvian sovereignty was in doubt in
light of the fact that the Peruvian capital was occupied and the few
remaining Peruvian Government officials had fled to the mountains.
Under those historical circumstances, there is even doubt as to whether
the Extradition Treaty remained in effect between the United States
and Peru. Finally, Ker's seizure was executed by a privately employed
Pinkerton agent, whereas the DEA has acknowledged that it arranged
for the abduction of Alvarez-Machain and that it has rewarded, and in
fact, continues to protect his abductors. Thus, there are strong arguments that Ker is distinguishable.
Perhaps the best reason for rejecting Ker as controlling in this case is
that the Ker opinion reflected a late-nineteenth-century understanding
of international law. States, not private persons, were the exclusive subjects of international law. Thus, the Court would not permit Ker to
assert an individual right to asylum under a treaty - a right to remain
in Peru even where the Peruvian government did not care to protest his
removal. Today, courts are much more apt to recognize that a treaty
can confer on individuals certain legal rights that may be cognizable in
a court.4
Other developments in domestic law have also cast doubt on the vitality of Ker. The whole due process revolution expanding procedural
rights is reflected in judicial efforts to trim back on Ker. For example,
in United States v. Toscanino,5 the Second Circuit held that the rule in
Ker
3.

Id. at 440.

4. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitution and International
Law, Continued, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 444, 462 (1990). See generally, Lowenfeld. Kidnaping by Government Order: A Follow-Up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1990) [hereinafter Lowenfeld, Kidnaping]. The critical shift of focus from states to individuals as subjects of international law is one of the most revolutionary legal developments of our
time. See generally, Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
5. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally Comment, United States v. Toscanino, 88 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1975).
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cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's expansion of the concept of
due process, which now protects the accused against pretrial illegality by denying

to the government the fruits of its exploitation of any deliberate and unnecessary
lawlessness on its part .... [Wlhen an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought

within the jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over his person represents
the fruits of the government's exploitation of its own misconduct. 6

The government misconduct alleged by Toscanino included being kidnapped in Montevideo, Uruguay, knocked unconscious, bound, blindfolded, held without food or water, interrogated and tortured with the
participation of an employee of the United States Bureau of Narcotics
over a period of seventeen days.
After Toscanino United States courts tried to apply a "shock-theconscience" exception to the Ker rule. 7 Thus, if the government's misconduct was so egregious as to "shock the conscience," the Ker rule
would not apply, and the defendant could raise the defense against jurisdiction. Experience has shown that the Toscanino exception is not an
effective prophylactic to government-sponsored kidnapping and the
mistreatment which may accompany irregular methods. The failure of
this exception is neatly summarized by one authority: "There are no
nice abductions." 8 The facts in Alvarez-Machain are further evidence
that allowing a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident alien
improperly brought before the court sanctions official involvement in
abduction and bribery in violation of both principles of due process as
well as basic tenets of international human rights.
Second, if Ker is either distinguished or reversed, the question becomes whether the Government's action in this case in fact violated
either due process under the United States Constitution or international law, as evidenced by the Extradition Treaty with Mexico or by
customary international law.
In the following amicus curiae brief for the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, Professor Ruth Wedgwood argues convincingly that
the United States Government's involvement in the abduction of Alvarez-Machain violated both the Extradition Treaty and customary international law. Her arguments need no repeating here. Her brief does not
raise the alternative argument that the United States Government violated due process. Without presupposing the views of the Lawyers'
6. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275.
7. See United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975) (applying Toscanino only where the defendant could
prove "torture, brutality or similar outrageous conduct").
8. Lowenfeld, Kidnaping, supra note 4, at 716.
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Committee for Human Rights or Professor Wedgwood's argument, I
will comment briefly on the due process question.
With increasing frequency, the United States Government is engaged abroad in activities that would not withstand constitutional scrutiny if undertaken within the borders of the United States. Two such
recent examples are the search and seizure of Panamanian General
Manuel Noriega's private effects in Panama without a judicial warrant
and the censorship of, and restrictions imposed upon, United States and
foreign media operating in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War. In both
cases, the United States Government had strong arguments supporting
its activities in the name of national security. Irrespective of whatever
merit such national security claims may have, the United States Government could not have justified the same actions in the United States
under the rubric of national security. Imagine, for example, the public
outcry if the President had informed the major American networks
during the Gulf War that they must present all copy to government
censors before broadcasting material in order to protect national
security.
It is unclear when or how the Constitution limits the activities of the
United States Government abroad. Last year, in an opinion that
seemed to give a green light to American activities in Panama, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment warrant
requirement does not apply to illegal searches and seizures by United
States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien outside
the United States. 9 Writing for the majority Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged that portions of the Constitution may protect nonresident
aliens from the consequences of United States Government action
abroad. For example, the Chief Justice recognized that the fifth
amendment could apply at least to some cases involving nonresident
aliens."0 Nevertheless, the Chief Justice struggled to distinguish the
scope of the fourth amendment, which provides that the "right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,"' 1 from the
fifth amendment's guarantees that "no person" should be required to
testify against himself."2 Contrasting the fifth amendment's protection
of "persons" with the second, fourth, ninth, and tenth amendment protection of the rights of "the people," the Chief Justice wrote that "the
9. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
10. Verdugo-Urquidez, U.S. at -,
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.

-

U.S. -,
110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
110 S. Ct. at 1060.
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people" protected by the fourth amendment "refers to a class of per-

sons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of
13

that community.1
The Court reached this conclusion with little reference to historical
record or precedent; rather, the Court discerned this distinction merely

from the plain meaning of the words. In defending the logic of this
linguistic distinction, the Court seemed to narrow the extraterritorial

application of even the fifth amendment. The Court opined that the
reason the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination protects nonresident aliens is that the violation of the right occurs when
the incriminating statement is introduced at trial in the United
States.14 By contrast the fourth amendment right against an illegal
search or seizure is violated at the time of the search or seizure, according to the Chief Justice.'" Thus, it appears that the Constitution
never literally applies abroad, but merely restrains some - but not all
of the evidence that can be introduced into an American court. 1
Doubt is cast on Chief Justice Rehnquist's assumption that the Constitution does not limit the United States Government abroad by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Reid v. Covert.'" There the Court considered the extraterritorial effect of the due process clause as it applied to
the court-martial of two civilian widows of American soldiers serving

abroad. 18 The women were convicted of murdering their husbands on
United States bases overseas. The women argued that they had been

denied due process. The Court held that the fifth amendment's due pro13. Verdugo-Urquidez, U.S. at.,
110 S. Ct. at 1061.
14. Id. at 1060.
15. Id.
16. Rehnquist seemed to be addressing the recently concluded U.S. invasion of
Panama, when he added at the conclusion of his opinion:
For better or for worse, we live in a world of nation-states in which our Government must be able to "functio[n] effectively in the company of sovereign nations." Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958). Some who violate our laws
may live outside our borders under a regime quite different from that which
obtains in this country. Situations threatening to important American interests
may arise halfway around the globe, situations which in the view of the political
branches of our Government require an American response with armed force. If
there are to be restrictions on searches and seizures which occur incident to such
American action, they must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation.
Id. at 1066. Hence, the significance of Professor Wedgwood's brief is in part to distinguish the Court's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez by showing that here the Mexican Government's invocation of the Extradition Treaty provides precisely the limitation that the
Court found lacking in Verdugo-Urquidez.
17. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
18. Id. at 5.
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cess right to trial by jury applied to United States persons abroad.
Writing for a plurality, Justice Black articulated a vision of the Constitution that is quite different from Chief Justice Rehnquist's: "The
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.... It can only
act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution."' 9
Justice Black believed that the Constitution does not merely protect
the rights of Americans within the United States. Rather, it limits the
power of the Government to intrude on the rights of private persons
everywhere. The United States Government has only those powers provided by the Constitution, and such powers certainly do not include
arbitrary arrest or abduction.
If the Ninth Circuit agrees that the Government's abduction of Alvarez-Machain violated due process and international law, it will
strengthen both constitutional and international limitations on what the
United States Government can do abroad, and it will reaffirm the priority that our system of justice places on individual liberties. In Professor Wedgwood's elegant language, "it is the glory of the United States
and its system of justice that we proceed by principle rather than expedience. The short-run temptation to obtain and punish a particular
de20
fendant should not be allowed to endanger the liberty of all."
In one of his last dissents on the Court, Justice Brennan warned that
the majority in Verdugo-Urquidez had ignored "basic notions of mutuality," such that "[i]f we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens should
be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we investigate, prosecute and punish them. '21 He added that "[miutuality also
serves to inculcate the values of law and order. By respecting the rights
of foreign nationals we encourage other nations to respect the rights of
our own citizens. 22
Justice Brennan's appeal to international comity in the context of a
criminal prosecution might strike some observers as novel. 23 The comity
doctrine has been applied in the United States for example to enforce
arbitration clauses (that otherwise would be prohibited by United
19. Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
20. Wedgwood, Amicus Curiae Brief Filed by The Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights in United States v. Humberto Alvarez-Machain, 6 AI. U.J. INTL L. & POL'Y
537 (1991).
21. Verdugo-Urquidez, U.S. at -, 110 S. Ct. at 1071.
22. Id.
23. International comity is the general principle that the courts of the United
States will respect the laws of other countries and enforce foreign judgments except
where there is a conflict with fundamental United States public policy. See generally
Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1991).
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States antitrust and securities law) in transactions involving foreign
parties24 or to limit the reach of antitrust laws to foreign conduct." *
American courts have shown a willingness to take comity seriously
when what is at stake is the freedom to do business. Yet, when American forces or agents ignore the territorial sovereignty of another state,
seize property abroad without a warrant, and even abduct foreign nationals, the courts do not seem disturbed that comity may be offended.
The judicial aversion to the risk of offending a foreign sovereign seems
inversely proportional to the actual risk; the greater the offense the less
our courts seem willing to act to protect the principle of sovereign
equality that underlies the comity doctrine.
Professor Wedgwood's argument is an attempt to reassert the value
of mutuality in the context of our conduct toward foreign sovereigns.
Her appeal is as timely as it is important.

24. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
25. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
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Editor's Note
While this article was pendingpublication, a panel of the Ninth Circuit addressed similar issues in involving another Mexican national
who was apprehended in Mexico for the murder of DEA Special
Agent Camarena.1 In United States v. Verdugo-Urguidez, the Ninth
Circuit held that if the United States authorized or sponsored the abduction of a Mexican nationalfrom Mexico, and Mexico subsequently
objected under the United States - Mexico Extradition Treaty, the
United States courts would have no personaljurisdiction over that defendant. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for
evidentiary hearings on the question whether the United States authorized or sponsored the abduction and to receive any further communications from the Government of Mexico before ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss. The United States has petitioned for a
rehearing by the Ninth Circuit en banc.
Thus, at present the Ninth Circuit retains appellate jurisdiction
over both the Verdugo-Urquidez and Alvarez-Machain appeals. The
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez relies on the arguments
raised by Professor Wedgwood in the brief that follows.

1. 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15568.

